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ANY MORE LIGHT ON HADDOCK v. HADDOCK?
THE PROBLEM OF DoMICIL IN D1voRcE

Harold Wright Holt*

A

T first glance it seems a work of foolhardiness or of supererogation to embark upon a rediscussion of any problems arising from
Haddock v. Haddock.1 True, the decision of the majority of the
Supreme Court in that case has not won wholehearted support from
the bench or legal profession. 2 True it is, also, that collusive divorces
still :flourish. 3 These considerations alone might, perhaps, lead the
reader to concede that it would not be unfruitful to speculate upon an
eventual modification of some of the principles which the Court in that
case approved. If, however, further justification is demanded of the
writer for the course he is about to take, he begs the reader to keep in
mind that the progress of legal thought during the last three decades
and a half may have brought about a modification of the re~oning upon
which the Supreme Court based its decision. Courts have a tendency
to utilize changes in the content of concepts in one type of case as a
justification for making similar alterations in the content of the same
or similar concepts in another field of litigation.4 This tendency may

*

Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B., Dartmouth;
LL.B., S.J.D., Harvard. Contributor to various law reviews.-Ed.
1 201 U.S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
2
Even Professor Beale announced a modification of his attitude of disapproval
of the case only after hope had faded that the Supreme Court would reverse its action
at the first opportunity and he had become convinced that the Haddock case was one
that he had to "live with." Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 HARV. L. REv. 417
(1926).
8
See Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 M1cH. L. REv. 749 at 750-751
(1936); cf. 36 CoL. L. REv. 1121 (1936).
4 For example, consider the weight given in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294
U.S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553 (1935), to the cases of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352,
47 S. Ct. 632 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 S. Ct. 259 (1928),
and Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599 (1933).
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be especially strong when there has been marked popular or professional disapproval of judicial development in the latter field.
THE CoNCEPT OF DoMICIL

Its Significance in Tax Law
It is in the field of taxation that material is found for such a remodelling of a concept on which American courts base jurisdiction for
divorce, 5-the concept of domicil. Prior to 1939 the state of a person's
domicil had come to hold a position of vantage in taxation. Seemingly,
unless the assets in question had a special "business situs," the Federal
Constitution allowed only the state of a decedent's last domicil to tax
the succession to certain assets that he had owned, such as state bonds
and municipal certificates of indebtedness, 6 bank deposits, promissory
notes and corporate bonds,7 indebtedness for advances and unpaid
dividends 8 and corporate stock.9
But what is "dornicil"? To define the concept in broad terms is not
difficult. The American Law Institute has done so.10 Its work has not
met with universal approbation. 11 However, undoubtedly all agree
that to acquire a so-called "dornicil of choice" within a state a person
must be physically present within that state with a certain intent.12
Difficulties have arisen from the application of the concept, as happens with attempts to apply other legal concepts that are defined in
broad termsl3 Troubles of litigants have not by any means been miti5

"Jurisdiction for divorce" means the power of a state to grant a' divorce which
will be recognized as valid in other states.
6
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930).
7
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930).
8
Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1, 51 S. Ct. 54 (1930).
9
First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932). For
a discussion of domicil in connection with taxation, see Tweed and Sargent, "Death and
Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile," 53 HARV. L. REV. 68 (1939).
10 "Domicil is the place with which a person has a settled connection for certain
legal purposes, either because his home is there, or because that place is assigned to him
by the law." CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 9 (1934).
11
Coudert, "Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil," 36 YALE L. J. 949
(1927).
12
"To acquire a domicil of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-place with
the intention of making it his home. The fact of physical presence at a dwelling-place
and the intention to make it a home must concur; if they do so, even for a moment,
the change of domicil takes place." CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, § 15 (2),
(3) (1934).
18
E.g., "due process" and "scope of authority."
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gated by judicial adherence to the theory of "one man, one domicil," 14
as the Dorrance estate litigation witnesses.15 Application of the concept
by two or more courts in attempts to determine the last domicil of a
particular decedent might well lead to diverse conclusions.16

The Problem of Single Domicil v. Multiple Domicils
Not until r939 did the Supreme Court give any sign that remodelling of the concept was in order. In that year the Court decided Texas
v. Florida. 11 In his dissent Justice Frankfurter, after stating the "historic rule" that for purposes of legal relations a person can and must
have only one domicil at a time, goes on to say:
"Nevertheless, it often represents a fiction. Certainly in many
situations the determination of a man's domicile is by no means the
establishment of an event or a fact that exists in nature. Even assuming that there is general agreement as to the elements which
in combination constitute domicile, a slight shift of emphasis in
applying the formula produces contradictory results." 18
And again:
"Two state courts can very legitimately find two different domiciles, in that two equally competent tribunals utilizing the same
outward facts in the alembic of the same common law concept of
domicile may easily distil contradictory conclusions." 19
The "historic rule," he reasons, worked satisfactorily in earlier days
because "its difficulties of application were circumscribed when wealth
predominantly consisted of realty and tangibles, and when restricted
modes of transportation and communication conditioned fixity of residence." Under present day conditions "the inflexible doctrine of domicile-one man, one home-is in danger of becoming a social anachronism."
14

"Every person has at all times one domicil, and no person has more than one
domicil at a time." CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, § II (1934).
15
ln re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163, A. 303 (1932), petition forcertiorari denied 288 U. S. 617, 53 S. Ct. 507 (1933); In re Dorrance, II5 N. J. Eq.
268, 170 A. 601 (1934), certiorari denied 298 U. S. 678, 56 S. Ct. 949 (1936);
and see Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 278 (1935). See also Harper, "Final
Determination of Domicil in the United States," 9 IND. L. J. 586 (1934), and Tweed
and Sargent, "Death and Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile," 53 HARV. L.
REV. 68 (1939).
16
As in the case of the Dorrance estate.
17
306 U.S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939).
18
Id., 306 U. S. at 429.
19
Id., 306 U.S. at 432. The other quotations in the text are from page 429.
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Justice Frankfurter would not abolish use of the concept of domicil. He only protests against giving it a content that no longer makes
the concept a satisfactory tool. His protest is directed against a rigid
conceptualism-the concept of domicil as essentially unitary.20
Justice Stone, speaking for the majority, said:
"That two or more states may each constitutionally assess death
taxes on a decedent's intangibles upon a judicial determination that
the decedent was domiciled within it in proceedings binding upon
the representatives of the estate, but to which the other states are
not parties, is an established principle of our federal jurisprudence." 21
He and his associates comprising the majority were of the opinion
that only when the taxes assessed by the several states would more
than consume the entire estate should the Supreme Court entertain an
original suit to determine the last domicil of the deceased.
In support of his quoted statement Justice Stone cites six cases.
Thormann v. Frame, 22 Overby v. Gordon, 23 and Baker v. Baker, Eccles
& Co. 24 deal with the extrastate effect to be given an ex parte grant
of probate administration. These cases, as well as the case of Iowa v.
Slimmer, 25 rest upon the well-established principle that wherever the
domicil of a decedent may have been at death, a state has jurisdiction
to administer assets left by him within its borders. Burbank v. Ernst 26
holds that a Texas decree admitting a will to probate does not bar a
Louisiana court from inquiring anew into the domicil of the deceased
and from finding that he died domiciled in Louisiana. Worcester County
Trust Co. v. Riley 21 is to the effect that under the Federal Interpleader
Act of r936 the taxing officials of two states-California and Massachusetts-cannot be interpleaded by an administrator or executor for a
determination as to which of the states is entitled to assess and collect
death taxes as the state in which the deceased died domiciled. To allow
the suit, the Court held, would contravene the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution. Only in this last case can direct support be found
2
°Cf. his criticisms of the use of the phrases "taxable event," "jurisdiction to tax,''
etc., in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 246 at 250.
21
Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 at 410, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939).
22
176 U.S. 350, 20 S. Ct. 446 (1900).
23
177 U.S. 214, 20 S. Ct. 603 (1900).
24
242 U.S. 394, 37 S. Ct. 152 (1917).
25
248 u. s. II5, 39 s. Ct. 33 (1918).
26
232 U.S. 162, 34 S. Ct. 299 (1914).
21
302 U.S. 292, 58 S. Ct. 185 (1937).
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for Justice Stone's quoted statement. Interestingly enough, it is he
who speaks for the unanimous court in Worcester County Trust Co.
v. Riley. There he says:
"Petitioner's real concern is that the judgment of the California
court, if it should decide that decedent was domiciled there, may
be erroneous or may conflict with that of the Massachusetts courts.
But conflicting decisions upon the same issue of fact do not necessarily connote erroneous judicial action. Differences in proof and
the latitude necessarily allowed to the trier of fact in each case
to weigh and draw inferences from evidence and to pass upon the
credibility of witnesses, might lead an appellate court to conclude
that in none is the judgment erroneous. . . . Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full faith and credit clause requires
uniformity in the decisions of the courts of different states as to
the place of domicil, where the exertion of state power is dependent upon domicil within its boundaries." 28
For this last statement he cites the five cases just mentioned as
cited in Texas v. Florida.
The "established principle of our federal jurisprudence" of which
Justice Stone speaks in Texas v. Florida was thus "established'' by him
about fifteen months earlier in the Riley case. We need not concern
ourselves with the length of time properly required for the "establishment" of a "principle." It is more significant that he spoke for an
unanimous Court in the earlier case and for the majority of seven in
the later, and that in Texas v. Florida the majority and minority
agreed that no question of the Constitution was presented merely because two or more states each claimed to be privileged to assess certain
taxes as the state of the deceased's last domicil. The concept of "multiple domicils" is not inherently vicious, it seems. At least the Supreme
Court in the matter of death taxes is willing to allow states to disagree
as to the domicil of a decedent unless certain extraordinary circumstances exist similar to those in Texas v. Florida.

Significance of Concept of Domicil in Divorce
Turn now to the situation in divorce. The thought has been that
jurisdiction for divorce rests with a state only if it is the domicil of at
least one of the parties.29 A federal constitutional question may be presented when the court of one state is alleged to have denied full faith
28

Id., 302 U. S. at 299.

29 CoNFLICT oF LAWS RESTATEMENT,

§

II I

(1934); but cf. §

112.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

and credit to a divorce decree of another. So far as the Supreme Court
has given rulings, jurisdiction to give a divorce that will be entitled to
full faith and credit rests with the state in which both spouses are domiciled so or with the state in which one is domiciled if personal jurisdiction is had over the respondent spouse 81 or-if the husband is the
spouse who first sues,-with the state in which the two were last
domiciled together as man and wife. 82
Whether or not full faith and credit is due the decree might hinge
on whether or not the statute under which the court granted the decree complied with requirements of due process as to service of process.
Due process would, perhaps, be violated when neither party was domiciled within the divorcing state. This is a matter of conjecture. There
is no decision of the Supreme Court on the point. 33 Due process would
reasonably be held to be violated in such case on the ground that the
state was attempting to act in a dispute beyond its competency to adjudicate. The interests of the respondent spouse, if not of the complainant,
and of the state in which the respondent spouse is domiciled, if not the
state of the complainant's domicil, would be beyond its power to regulate.
No more need be said at this point to bring out the importance of
the concept of domicil in the matter of divorce jurisdiction. It is pertinent to inquire whether application of the concept is less difficult in
problems of jurisdiction for divorce than in problems of constitutionality of taxation. It will be seen that application of the concept in the
former is fully as fruitful of perplexities as its application in the latter
field of the law. It could hardly be otherwise as long as each state of
the American Union is free to exercise its present legislative powers
in the matter of divorce.
The diversity of the divorce laws of the several states is too well
known to require lengthy discussion. The practice of some states may
meet the approval of those who are opposed to divorce, the practice
of other commonwealths may equally well please those who favor
"free and easy" severance of the bonds of matrimony. A state may,
as does South Carolina, 84 provide in its constitution that its courts shall
See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 at 570, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. 108 (1869), semble; Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U.S. 562 at 570, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
82
Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544 (1901).
88 Cases before the Supreme Court have been concerned with the effect or applicability of the full faith and credit clause.
84
S. C. Const. (1895), art. 17, § 3·
30

81
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never grant divorces a 'Vinculo or it may, as does New York,85 allow
only adultery as a ground for absolute divorce. At the other extreme a
state may hold that any one of several reasons suffices to allow the
granting of a divorce,--cruelty, desertion, incompatibility, the contraction of habits of intoxication, the contraction of venereal disease,
imprisonment, insanity and so on. Congress has no power to legislate
for the states what the grounds for divorce shall be. It is also for the
state legislatures, save for possible restrictions imposed by the due
process clause, to regulate procedure in divorce suits.

Amorphous Character of the Concept in Divorce
It has been shown that full faith and credit are due a divorce decree
only when certain requirements as to domicil have been met and also,
in certain cases, certain requirements as to personal jurisdiction over
the respondent. Whether or not requirements in addition to these
shall be satisfied before a state exercises its jurisdiction to divorce is
for the state itself, not for Congress, to settle. Undoubtedly a state may
give a content to the concept of "domicil" more difficult to satisfy than
any minimum that would satisfy the Supreme Court. It is not at all
uncommon for a divorce statute to require that one or both of the
parties shall have resided for a certain period of time in the state before
suit brought. This requirement of "residence" is one superimposed
upon the requirement of "domicil." 86 Conceivably what the states do
by legislation they might do by judicial decision. The courts of a state
might build up "case law" to the effect that abiding in the state for a
number of years or months was necessary to enable the acquisition of
a domicil for divorce jurisdiction.
Congress itself has no power to prescribe what shall constitute
domicil for jurisdiction in divorce. However, if a state purports to
exercise such jurisdiction, and full faith and credit is denied its decree
in some other state, the Supreme Court may hold that the decree was
without legal consequences in the sister state because the state in which
the decree was rendered had not been the domicil of either one of the
parties 87 or, in a Haddock v. Haddock situation, of the respondent wife.
85 N. Y. Civil Practice Act (1937), § 1147. As to dissolution of marriage on the
ground of absence, see N. Y. Domestic Relations Law (McKinney, Supp. 1940), § 7a,
added by Laws (1922), c. 279, § 3, and amended by Laws (1934), c. 57; Laws
(1936), c. 182, and Laws (1937), c. 49.
36 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., § 125 (1938).
87
Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
181 U. S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct.
237 (1903).
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Take an extreme case. Suppose a state by statute allows a married
woman to gain a domicil within its borders merely by :filing in person
with the clerk of court at the institution of her suit for divorce a deposition that she is then present in the state with intent to make her home
therein. A divorce is granted a woman who has complied with the
statute. Recognition is denied the decree in a sister state. The court
in the latter finds that neither spouse had ever had a domicil in the
former. The case goes to the Supreme Court. Counsel for the wife
contend that merely by complying with the statute in the state of
divorce she had acquired a domicil therein. The Supreme Court would
probably uphold the denial of recognition of the decree on the ground
that compliance with the statute did not suffice. It would probably hold
that the statute did not prescribe sufficient minimum requirements for
the acquisition of a domicil. In passing such a statute the legislature of
the state, so the Court might reason, was attempting to confer upon
the courts of the state a jurisdiction not within the power of the state
to confer. The case would go to the Supreme Court on the full faith
and credit question, but it would not be unprecedented for the Supreme
Court to base its answer to that question upon no particular clause of
the Constitution. 38 The Court would be passing upon a question of
jurisdiction between states making inconsistent or conflicting claims.
The Supreme Court may be reluctant to hold that a state has no power
to legislate on a matter that is not within the legislative powers of
Congress. When it does feel that a state statute goes beyond the limits
which considerations of reasonable expediency would place on the
jurisdiction of a state as one of several members of a federal union,
the Court could uphold a denial of full faith and credit thereto on the
ground that the enacting state failed to show a "governmental interest" that was "superior" to that of the sister state.39
Consider another and more probable case. A woman obtains a
divorce. The husband received personal service of process in the state
in which she sued or voluntarily appeared. He never had a domicil in
that state, but the court found that the wife had acquired a domicil
there. A sister state denies recognition to the decree as a termination
38

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 38 S. Ct. 337 (1918).
An interesting analogy is to be found in the Supreme Court's treatment of
workmen's compensation cases involving conflict of laws problems. See Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. ~45, 52 S. Ct. 571 (1932); Alaska Packers Assn. v.
Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U. S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629
(1939).
'
89
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of the marriage. The second court holds that in light of what happened
after the decree the wife could not reasonably be found ever to have
been domiciled in the state of divorce prior to the decree. She had never
had the requisite intent-that of making a home in the state where the
divorce decree was obtained. The case goes to the Supreme Court.
Past decisions indicate that the Court will affirm the denial of recognition if it finds that the wife could not reasonably be found ever to
have had the intent requisite for the acquisition of a domicil. 40 The
indication is that the Court will hold a decree of divorce beyond the
competency of the state of rendition so far as the right to full faith and
credit is concerned only when certain minimum requirements as to
domicil have been violated. Undoubtedly the Court is committed to
holding that one cannot acquire a domicil in a state for purposes of
divorce unless one is physically present there with a certain intent.
It is by this time evident that as applied in problems of jurisdiction for divorce the content of the concept of domicil is at times decidedly amorphous. It was a similar amorphousness in the field of
taxation that led to Justice Frankfurter's bold adoption in Texas v.
Florida of the theory of "multiple domicils" at which Justice Stone had
hinted in Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley. Admit, so Justice
Frankfurter reasons, that a state should be allowed to levy death taxes
on the intangible assets left by a decedent only when he was enjoying
at death the benefits of the government of that state to such an extent
that the state could reasonably claim him as one of its "subject beneficiaries."41 In simpler times it was rarely the case that one enjoyed
"the fruits of civilization" of more than one state. Now, however, many
persons, particularly persons of means, enjoy a mobility unknown to an
earlier era and it is possible for one to invoke and enjoy at one time the
benefits of several state governments. 42 Therefore, he concludes, it
should be recognized that a person may be the "subject beneficiary''
at any one time of more than one state government. Upon this basis
does he found the doctrine of "multiple domicils."
Similarly, it may be admitted that only the state that is closely
concerned with the family life of a man and wife should exercise jurisdiction to divorce them. In the case of the villager who, according to
40 See Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 ( 1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
181 U.S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct.
237 (1903).
n Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U. S. 87 at 100, 48 S. Ct.
100 (1927), dissenting opinion of Holmes, J.
42
Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 at 429, 430, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939).
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his epitaph, was "born, bred and, what is somewhat rarish, hanged in
this self-same parish," there would have been no difficulty in determining what state was intimately concerned with his marital affairs. There
could have been but one. Now, however, the simple villager may see a
good deal of the world in his life time. It is not only the fortunate
rich man with an apartment in New York, a winter home in Florida,
a "cottage" on the "North Shore" of Massachusetts and, perhaps, a
hunting lodge in Canada who enjoys the benefits of several governments. A man of humble circumstances may move his residence from
one to any other of two or three states while continuing to work in the
same state or even in the same group of states. It might be difficult to
determine whether any one of these states was more closely concerned
with his family life than any other.
It may be that the same changes in civilization which are leading in
the field of taxation to a collapse of the concept of "domicil" as something essentially "unitary" justify a remodelling of the concept in the
field of divorce. Does Haddock v. Haddock in its reasoning contain
an advance veto on such a change so strong that only a direct repudiation of the case by the Supreme Court will make it possible to have a
reconstruction of the concept? Or is it possible that with only slight
modifications Haddock v. Haddock may itself guide us to a new order?
To a consideration of these problems attention will now be directed.
As a preliminary Haddock v. Haddock should be given a more detailed discussion.
ANALYSIS OF HADDOCK

v. HADDOCK

Only a brief statement of the facts in the case is necessary. On the
day of their marriage in I868 the Haddocks separated. Mrs. Haddock
remained in New York, where the marriage had taken place, but Haddock ultimately became domiciled in Connecticut. There in I 88I he
sued for an absolute divorce on the ground of his wife's alleged "willful
desertion for three years with total neglect of duty." 43 She was not
personally served in Connecticut, but apparently did have actual knowledge of the pendency of the suit. She put in no appearance, however,
and Haddock had a decree by default. In I 894 the wife instituted a
suit for separate maintenance in New York. For lack of personal service
on the husband the decree in her favor wast ineffectual to secure alimony. In r899 she brought another suit for separate support in New
York, claiming that her husband had been guilty of "abandonment"
48

Conn. Pub. Acts (1878), c; 71, p. 305.
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and "neglect or refusal to provide" for her. 44 In that action the husband was served with process personally. He pleaded his Connecticut
decree in bar to Mrs. Haddock's suit. The New Yark courts held that
full faith and credit were not to be given to the Connecticut decree as
terminating the marriage relation. They took the position that they
were at liberty, untrammeled by the decision of the Connecticut court,
to decide anew whether Mrs. Haddock had left her spouse wrongfully
prior to I 88 I or whether he, on the contrary, had wrongfully fled from
her. The Supreme Court of the United States held that it was not
obligatory upon the New York courts to recognize the Connecticut
decree as a termination of the marriage in toto so as to be a bar to the
action brought by Mrs. Haddock. 45 In other words the Connecticut
decree was not entitled to full faith and credit.
There was no dispute as to Haddock's domicil at the time he sued
for divorce in Connecticut. He had already become a domiciliary of that
state. Had he not, the decree would not have been entitled to recognition in New Yark as terminating the marriage.46 Had he not been so
domiciled, then even if Mrs. Haddock had personally appeared in the
suit, the decree of the Connecticut court would have been in no better
position under the full faith and credit clause than was the decree
granted the husband in South Dakota in the case of Andrews v. Andrews.41 That decree failed of recognition in Masschusetts as a termination of the marriage relation because it had been rendered in a state in
which neither the husband nor' the wife had a domicil. The wife had
entered an appearance in the South Dakota suit, but had not contested.
One of the dissenting justices in Haddock v. Haddock stated that
it was not certain from the testimony given before the New York
referee whether the separation of the Haddocks had been by mutual
consent or whether·the husband had abandoned the wife; 48 but Justice
N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. (1881), § 1762.
no question can arise on this record concerning the right of the State of
Connecticut within its borders to give effect to the decree of divorce rendered in favor
of the husband by the courts of Connecticut, he being at the time when the decree was
rendered domiciled in that State." Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 at 572, 26
S. Ct. 525 (1906). See also statements at 201 U. S. 605-606.
Neither Justice Brown nor Justice Holmes ( dissenting) could understand how
the Connecticut decree could be denied an effect in New York similar to that it had in
Connecticut. Id., 201 U.S. 626, 632. Cf. 2 BEALE, THE CoNFLICT OF LAws, § 135.2
(1935); CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 113, comment g (1934).
46
Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
181 U.S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553 (1901).
41 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1903).
48
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 at 625, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
44

45 " • • •
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White, who gave the opinion for the majority, assumed as correct
without further inquiry the finding of the New York trial court, as
affirmed by the appellate courts of the state, that Mr. Haddock had
"wrongfully fled" from his wife. 49 In reading the opinion given for
the majority one must keep in mind this conviction that the husband
had wrongfully left his wife and that he alone had been domiciled in
Connecticut. 50 The opinion assumes fraud by Haddock--deception
practiced by him on the Connecticut court, seemingly the concealment
of facts which were later brought out in Mrs. Haddock's New Yark
suit. 51
In the Connecticut proceeding the issue had been whether or not
the wife had been guilty of "willful desertion" of the husband for three
years "with total neglect of duty." The court held that she had. In
New York the issue was whether the husband had been guilty of
"abandonment" and "neglect or refusal to provide." The court found
that he had been. His leaving his wife had been without "justifiable
cause." The New Yark court may have regarded Haddock's own testimony before it as amounting to an admission that he had abandoned his
wife and refused to live with her. 52 However that may oe, both the
Connecticut and New Yark courts must have found that for more than
three years prior to the institution of Mr. Haddock's suit in r88r he
and his wife were not living together. The Connecticut court must have
found Haddock was living apart from his wife with "justifiable cause."
Otherwise there could have been no "willful desertion . . . with total
neglect of duty" as required by the Connecticut divorce statute. 53 The
New York court found that he had left without "justifiable cause."
Whether or not Haddock had "'justifiable cause" to be living apart
from his wife must have been a point upon which the courts of the
two states differed. The opinion assumes that the Connecticut court
49

Id., 201 U. S. at 577.
It is also true that in his dissenting opinion Justice Brown speaks of the wife
as having a "separate" domicil. 201 U. S. at 609, 610-6II. To him the question
presented was whether or not a divorce granted the husband while domiciled in Connecticut as against a wife domiciled in another state, who was served by publication or
letter only, was a valid defense to a suit by the wife for separation and alimony. He
and his associates in the minority were of the opinion that Connecticut as the domicil
of the husband had jurisdiction to enter a decree of divorce entitled to full faith and
credit in New York even though it were to be admitted that the wife had not been
personally subject to the Connecticut court.
51 201 U.S. at 626.
62
201 U. S. at 626.
63
Bennett v. Bennett, 43 Conn. 313 (1876), semble.
50
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made a finding upon an issue that was later before the New York court,
but that the former did not have all the evidence that was before the
latter/' Nowhere is there any statement that anything turned on a
difference between the courts of the two states as to what conduct on
the part of Mrs. Haddock would have constituted "justifiable cause"
for Mr. Haddock's leaving. No issue appears of any difference between the substance given to the concept of "justifiable cause" in the
courts of Connecticut and the substance given to the concept in the
New York courts.
Implicit in the opinion of Justice White is the assumption that a
wife is or is not domiciled in the state where the husband is domiciled
at the time a divorce is granted to one or the other. His theory seems
to have been that only one answer could properly be given to the
question of the wife's domicil. Unless the wife has been personally
served in the state where the husband is domiciled and where he sues
for a divorce or unless she has personally appeared in his suit, it is
open to any other forum to question the finding of the divorce court
that not -only the husband, but the wife also, were domiciled within
the state of divorce, save in the exceptional circumstances of Atherton
v. Atherton,. 55 Even if both parties were subject to the jurisdiction in
personam of the divorce court, it is open to a court in another state,
when full faith and credit are sought for the divorce decree, to determine whether or not either spouse was domiciled in the state granting the decree. 56 If two or more states differ as to what is the domicil
of a person at a particular time, not more than one can be "right."
Seemingly the Supreme Court is to decide finally which one has been
"right."
No recognition can be found in his opinion or in any opinion of the
Supreme Court up to that time of any view that two or more states
might "legitimately" find two different domicils by "distillation" of
contradictory conclusions from the "same outward facts in the alembic of
the same common law concept of domicile." In a case like Andrews v.
Andrews, for example, South Dakota had found both husband and
wife domiciled in its territory. Massachusetts had found that neither
spouse had been domiciled in South Dakota at the time the husband
secured his divorce decree; and accordingly had refused to give recog5 ' Viz., evidence of facts brought out by Mr. Haddock's testimony before the New
York court in the suit brought by Mrs. Haddock. 201 U. S. at 626.
55 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544 (1901), facts stated infra, note 62.
58 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1903).
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nition to the decree of South Dakota as a termination of the marriage.
No consideration was given to the possibility that the finding of the
court in South Dakota was not unreasonable. Probably the fact that
within a day or two after the decree in South Dakota Mr. Andrews had
returned to Massachusetts and there resided until his death led the court
in Massachusetts as well as the Supreme Court to conclude that the
finding as to domicile in South Dakota was not reasonable. There was
no impugning of the honesty of the South Dakota court. Indeed, there
may have been a feeling that the South Dakota court had been deceived.111
Haddock v. Haddock, then, does not recognize the concept of
"multiple dom.icils." Neither does it squarely deny the possible desirability of such a concept. That question was not before the Court. Such
a question was neither presented nor argued by counsel. The extension
of the concept to divorce cases cannot be said to be foreclosed by any
dear and explicit decision of the Court. To support this thesis certain
hyp~thetical cases will now receive consideration.
CASE

I

AcQUISITION OF NEw DoMICIL BY WIFE FOR PuRPOSEs oF
D1voRcE, PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEING fun
OvER THE HusBAND

Suppose that a Mrs. Fish sues for a divorce in S-1, a state in which
Mr. Fish does not reside and in which he is not domiciled. She alleges
"cruelty" as the ground under the S-1 statute. In S-2, where the Fishes
last lived together as man and wife and where Mr. Fish continues to
be domiciled, "cruelty" is ground for only a judicial separation. Mr.
Fish contests the suit. The court finds him guilty of conduct which
satisfies its concept of "cruelty" and grants the wife a divorce. Under
S-2 law Mr. Fish's conduct would not have constituted "cruelty." In
granting the divorce the S-1 court must have found expressly or impliedly that Mrs. Fish had left her husband "justifiably." Otherwise
it would not, under the prevailing view in the United States, have
found that she had acquired a dom.icil apart from Mr. Fish for the purpose of getting a divorce. 58 Obviously the two states-S-1 and S-2di:lfer as to what constitutes a "justifiable" cause for leaving a husband.
57
58

Id., 188 U.S. at 41, 42.
See Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. 108 (1869).
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Assume that in some subsequent litigation the State S-2 court is confronted with the question whether to grant or deny recognition to the
S-r decree as an effective severance of the marriage relation. Could
the S-2 court hold that according to the substance of the concept of
"cruelty" obtaining in State S-2 the wife had riot been justified in
leaving Mr. Fish and the decree rendered by the court therein was not
entitled to full faith and credit?
No case involving this problem has come to the Supreme Court.
Haddock v. Haddock, as has been pointed out, does not deal with it.
Bell v. Bell,5° Streitwolf v. Streitwolj6° and Andrews v. Andrews 6 "are all concerned with the extrastate effect of a divorce obtained by a
husband in a state in which he and his wife never lived together. Each
of those cases seems to assume that the content given to the concept of
domicil in the court in which the husband obtained his divorce did not
differ materially from the content given to the concept in the court
in which the extrastate effect of the divorce decree was later brought
into question. The assumption seems to be that the court granting the
divorce had been led by the deception of the husband to find that he
was domiciled within the state in which the court sat-that the husband
made only a pretense of being domiciled within the state in which he
was suing for divorce, that he made only a pretense of complying with
the law of that state as to the acquisition of a domicil. Atherton v.
Atherton,62 to be sure, is a case in which the courts of Kentucky and
New York differed as to the domicil of the wife at the time the husband
instituted his suit in Kentucky, but the case does not turn on any issue
growing out of any difference in view as to when a wife would be allowed to acquire a domicil apart from her husband. 63 Neither does.
Cheever v. Wilson/'§, which recognizes the ability of a married woman
59

181 U.S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901).
181 U.S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553 (1901).
6
i. 188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237 (1903).
62 181 U.S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544 (1901). A New York woman married a Kentuckian in New York and went to Kentucky to live. After about three years' residence
she left her husband and returned to New York. The husband secured a divorce in
Kentucky on the ground of his wife's abandonment. The wife was not personally
served in Kentucky and did not appear in the suit. Thereafter the wife sued for a
limited divorce in New York on the ground of the husband's cruel and abusive treatment. The husband pleaded his Kentucky decree in bar. The New York courts held
the d·ecree was no bar to the wife's suit. The United States Supreme Court held that
the Kentucky decree was entitled to full faith and credit.
68 Presumably Kentucky would have been obliged to give full faith and credit
to a prior decree obtained by the wife in New York, personal service having been had
on the husband.
H 76 u. s. 108 (1869).
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to acquire a separate domicil for divorce, involve our problem. Of the
recent case of Davis v. Davis 65 more will be said later. It does not deal
with the problem just posed.

Determinability of Domicil by Law of Forum
In deciding whether or not Mrs. Fish had acquired a domicil for
the purpose of getting a divorce in S-1, the court of that state would
apply its own principles, standards and rules-not those of S-2. To
apply those of S-2 would not be in accord with conflict-of-laws principles for the solution of problems in "qualifications," so-called.66
This is illustrated by the case of Torlonia v. Torlonia.67 An American woman, domiciled in Connecticut, married an Italian and went to
live with him in Italy. According to Connecticut law her domicil became Italian. In Italy the husband committed adultery. Under Italian
law this was neither ground for a divorce nor a justification for the
wife to cease living with her husband. She did leave, however, returned
to Connecticut, and sued for a divorce in that state on the ground of
the husband's adultery. The court held that whether or not she had
reacquired a Connecticut domicil for the purpose of suing for a divorce
was to be settled according to the Connecticut law without reference
to the law of Italy.
It may well be that the divorce would not have been recognized as
valid in the courts of Italy. Whether or not it would have recognition
in the courts of another state of the American Union is a matter on
which one cannot be certain. Because the Italian husband appeared and
contested the wife's suit, it is, however, reasonably safe to predict that
another court in another state in this country would regard the Connecticut decree as an effective severance of the marital tie, at least as
between the immediate parties.68
Inapplicability of Doctrine of Res Judicata
It may be doubted whether under the doctrine of res judicata the
S-2 court should recognize the decree of the S-1 court. The issue litigated in S-I was whether according to the principles, standards and
rules there applied the wife (Mrs. Fish) had "justifiable" cause to
leave her husband and acquire a separate domicil in S-1. The court in
S-2 might admit such to be the fact, but would ask whether the finding
65

305 U.S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938).

66 CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT,§ IO

(1934).
e7 108 Conn. 292, 142 A. 843 (1928).
68 See Jacobs, "Attack on Decrees of Divorce," 34 MxcH. L. REV. 749 (1936)
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of the S-I court is an adjudication that under the principles, standards
and rules applied in S-2 Mrs. Fish had "justifiable" cause to leave the
husband. Obviously it is not.e 9
However, apart from any application of the doctrine of res judicata,
it is submitted that the court in S-2 might be obligated to recognize the
S- I decree as an e:ffective termination of the marriage. Implicit in the
S-1 decree is a determination by the court that Mrs. Fish had acquired
a domicil in S-I. Would the court in S-2 be allowed to deny recognition after it had investigated the matter of domicil and decided that
according to its principles, standards and rules Mrs. Fish had not had
a "justifiable" cause to leave her husband and had not, therefore,
acquired a separate domicil in S- I ? Would the court in S-2 be able to
hold that the case came within the principle of Andrews v. Andrews?
Would it have the same freedom to inquire into the jurisdictional fact
of domicil as the Massachusetts court had in that case?

The Problem of "Fault''-lts Bearing on Domidl
and Jurisdiction
Under reasonable interpretations of Haddock v. Haddock (with
which, however, the present writer does not agree), and according to
the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,7° the issue of "fault" for the
separation that took place between Mr. and Mrs. Fish would be a jurisdictional question. 71 The S-2 court could decide for itself whether Mrs.
Fish's leaving had been for a "justifiable" cause and, accordingly,
whether or not she had acquired a domicil in S-I sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the S-1 court. The decision of the majority in Haddock
v. Haddock has been adversely criticized in that it tends to put upon
the highest court of the land the burden of deciding "fault" between
a husband and wife in certain cases calling for a decision as to whether
or not full faith and credit has been improperly denied a divorce. 72
The opinion is of little help in telling how such question of "fault"
69

Cf. CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT,§ II3, comment c (1934).
Il3 (1934).
71
See Beale, "Haddock Revisited," 39 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1926); but cf.
Bingham, "The American Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court in the Matter of
Haddock v. Haddock," 21 CoRN. L. Q. 393 (1936), and McClintock, "Fault as an
Element of Divorce Jurisdiction," 37 YALE L. J. 564 (1928). See also Delanoy v.
Delanoy, 216 Cal. 27, 13 P. (2d) 719 (1932).
72
See Beale, "Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce," 19 HARV. L.
REv. 586 at 589 (1906); and see McClintock, "Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction," 37 YALE L. J. 564 at 571 et seq. (1928).
7
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should be answered. As yet no case has come before the Court that
required it to undertake such a task. It may well be that the Court
will never have to assume the burden.
It does not seem that the S-2 court could inquire into the sufficiency
of the cause for which Mrs. Fish had left her husband. Whether or not
his conduct constituted "cruelty" would be for the court in S-I alone to
decide. The content to be given the concept of "cruelty" under the S-I
divorce statute must necessarily be determined by the courts of that
state. The content is not to be marked out by the courts of S-2. For
example, the courts of S-I may hold that a husband can be guilty of
''cruelty" towards his wife without inflicting physical violence upon
her. The courts of S-2 may hold that under the statute of S-2 there
<:annot be "cruelty" by a husband towards his spouse unless he has
exerted physical force upon her. Each state would through its courts
give substance to the concept of "cruelty" under its own statute. Neither
would give substance to the concept under the statute of the other. The
sufficiency of the cause for Mrs. Fish's acquisition of a separate domicil
for purposes of divorce would fall within the jurisdiction of the S-1
court alone to decide. The Supreme Court has held that a wife may
acquire a domicil apart from her husband for purposes of divorce, 73
but it has never held that the "justifying'' cause must be one specified
and defined by the law of the state in which the parties were last domiciled together. 74
It would not be enough, however, that she had sufficient cause.
There would have to be certain physical contacts between her and the
state of S-1 before she could acquire a domicil therein. She would have
to be present personally within the state. 75 Her presence would not
have to be for any particular length of time, but she could not acquire
a domicil in S-I unless she had been there with a certain intention-that
of making her home there presently. 76 The court in S-2 would not
73

Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. 108 (1869).
"It is insisted that Cheever never resided in Indiana; that the domicil of the
husband is the wife's, and that she cannot have a different one from his. The converse
of the latter proposition is so well settled that it would be idle to discuss it. The rule is
that she may acquire a separate domicil whenwer it is necessary or proper that she
should do so. The right springs from the necessity for its exercise, and endures as long
as the necessity continues." Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. 108 at 123-124 (1869),
italics the writer's. But the Supreme Court has never stated any rules for determining
the "necessity'' or "propriety" of a wife's acquisition of a separate domicil.
75
CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, § l 6 ( I 934).
76 CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, §§ 19, 20 (1934). For critical comment,
see Coudert, "Some Considerations in the Law of Domicil," 36 YALE L. J. 949 (1927).
74
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be obligated to give full faith and credit to the S-1 decree if it would
be unreasonable to hold that at the time that decree had been granted
Mrs. Fish had acquired a home in the latter state. In some cases it
would be unreasonable to hold that she had.
Suppose, for example, that during her life with Mr. Fish in S-2
Mrs. Fish had held a business position, that on going to S-I she had
not resigned, but had taken a leave of absence long enough to permit
her to prosecute her divorce suit in S-I and that within two or three
days after the rendition of the decree she had returned to S-2, resumed
living there and begun to discharge again the duties of her business
position. The court in S-2 might hold that it could not reasonably be
found that Mrs. Fish had ever intended to make her home in S-1
and therefore had not acquired a domicil there and that recognition
was not to be given to the S-I decree as effectively terminating the
marriage relation. The Supreme Court of the United States would
very likely uphold the S-2 court.
Or suppose that for no reason other than the satisfaction of a mere
personal desire to live in S-2 Mrs. Fish had left S-I soon after the
granting of the decree and returned to S-2. The period intervening
between the entry of the decree and her return to S-2 might be so
short that the court in the latter state would hold that no reasonable
conclusion could be drawn that Mrs. Fish had ever intended to make
her home in S-I; that therefore she had not acquired a domicil therein
and that recognition of the S-1 decree was not required. Again the
Federal Supreme Court might sustain the S-2 court. At any rate the
Supreme Court would have an opportunity to indicate what it considered the minimum requirements for the acquisition of a separate
domicil by a married woman. At present nothing indicates that the
Court will set, as minima, requirements with which compliance will
be difficult. 7 7
At this point it may be urged that under Andrews v. Andrews and
Haddock v. Haddock the court of S-2 could, without regard to the
reasonableness of the determination in the court of S- I, decide whether
or not Mrs. Fish had acquired a domicil for divorce in S-1 and reach
a conclusion contrary to that reached in the S-I court. ( And such seems
to be the view of the Restatement.18 ) It must not be forgotten that at
77 See Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 21 S. Ct. 551 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf,
U.S. 179, 21 S. Ct. 553 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct.
237 (1903).
78
CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § u3, comment c (1934).
181

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

the time those cases were decided there was no reason to believe from
its prior decisions that the Supreme Court held to any belief that at
any one time a person might reasonably be found to be domiciled in
each of several states. Cases involving problems of domicil had not
been numerous and none had involved the possibility of what, for the
sake of convenience, has been termed "multiple domicils." 19

The Possibility of Multiple Domicils in Divorce
By I 941 in a situation like that presented by the hypothetical case
of Fish v. Fish the attitude may be that S-1 and S-2 courts could
reasonably differ as to where the wife was domiciled at the time she
obtained her divorce decree, and that it would not be improper for the
court in S-I to proceed on a concept of ''domicil" with a content different from thfl.t which would be given to it in a suit for divorce brought
in S-2. It may be that in this case the court in S-2 could not regard
the decree of the S-I court as not entitled to recognition as an effective
severance of the marriage relation.
According to Texas v. Florida any one of several states claiming
to be the domicil of a deceased at the time of his death can exert governmental power by way of levying taxes on the succession to his intangible property just as effectively as if no other state made the same
claim and exercised similar power. The exercise of governmental power
by one does not necessarily bar an exercise of similar power by other
states. Both majority and minority justices agreed that this was so in
many cases. The majority made an exception in cases where the tax
claims of all the claimant states would more than consume the assets
of the deceased. The minority would have made no such exception.
On the other hand, if the possibilityof"multipledomicils"berecognized and application of such concept made in our case of Fish v. Fish,
the court of S-2 will have to accept a decree of the court of S-1 as terminating a marriage which it would not have brought to an end had suit
for divorce between Mr. and Mrs. Fish been first filed in S-2. The
exercise of governmental power by S-I would bar an exercise of governmental power by S-2. This distinction is not material. After all, the
Kentucky court would have been obliged to give full faith and credit
to a New York decree in Atherton v. Atherton had the wife secured
her decree before the husband had brought his suit in Kentucky. so
79
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See, for example, Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400 (1852), and Lamar v. Micou,

u. &. 452, 5 s. Ct. 221 (1884).

so This would seem to follow from the decision in Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S.
108 (1869).
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The Significance of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
The contention that the court in S-2 would not have the same freedom to inquire into the domicil of Mrs. Fish in S-r as the Massachusetts court had to inquire into Mr. Andrews' domicil in South Dakota
in the case of Andrews v. Andrews is, it is submitted, supported by certain deductions to be drawn from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 81
The effect of that case on federal courts in their selection of choice-oflaws rules in conflicts cases is not clear. In certain :fields it may impose
no restriction on the power of Congress to legislate as to rules of decision in federal courts. 82 That is beside the point. We have seen how
limited Congress is in the matter of divorce legislation. In a case like
Texas v. Florida, where the Supreme Court sits as a court of original
jurisdiction between litigating states, the Court may be free to give its
own content to the concept of domicil-to build up a body of jurisprudence that will cut across that of the several states. (However, in
passing one may note that in Texas v. Florida seemingly all the states
involved gave similar, if not identical, substance to the concept. 88 ) In
cases like Andrews v. Andrews, Haddock v. Haddock or our hypothetical case of Fish v. Fish, or in any case involving the extension of
full faith and credit to a divorce decree, the Supreme Court does not
sit as a court of original jurisdiction, but as a court of review over state
tribunals. It does not have the same duty or opportunity to build up
its own body of law on the subject of domicil as it does in a case where
it is exercising original jurisdiction.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, by its denial of any "federal common law," suggests that the Supreme Court in a situation like that in
Haddock v. Haddock will not take upon itself the task of building up
a body of law, independent of any state law, as to "domicil" and
"fault." The paucity of cases before the Supreme Court since the Haddock case involving conflict of laws and divorce jurisdiction shows the
futility of expecting any such development. The most that the Supreme
Court will do in a case like our case of Fish v. Fish will be to uphold
a denial of recognition of the decree in situations ( r) where it feels
that a state court has failed to give a decent minimum content to the
concept of domicil so far as the acquisition of a domicil depends upon
the intent to acquire a home or ( 2) where in the light of events both
before and after the decree the required domicil could not have existed
81

304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
52 HARV. L. REV. l002 (1939).
88
Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 at 413, 59 S. Ct. 563, 830 (1939).
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in the state of divorce for lack of the requisite intent to acquire a home
therein.
It would be unreasonable to hold in a case like Fish v. Fish that
the reasoning in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins suggests that in deciding whether or not the S-2 court should recognize the S-r decree as
an effective termination of the marriage relation, the Supreme Court
should follow the law of S-2 as to what constitutes "domicil.". This
would be tantamount to holding that whenever S-2 refuses recognition,
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in S-r, to a divorce obtained in
S-r by a wife under circumstances like those supposed in Fish v. Fish,
the dice would be loaded in favor of the court in S-2, i.e., the decision
of the S-2 court would be upheld by the Supreme Court. The majority
opinion in Haddock v. Haddock would not give any such preference
to the law of S-2. The opinion recognizes that in some instances a
divorce obtained by a husband in a state in which the wife has not been
personally served and into which she has refused to follow the husband may be entitled to full faith and credit.84 It also recognizes that
a divorce obtained by a wife in a state in which the husband has never
been domiciled may be entitled to full faith and credit, provided
personal jurisdiction is obtained over the husband. 85 There is nothing
to show that Justice White thought that the question of the wife's domicil was in every case to be settled with reference to the legal concepts
applied by the courts in the state in which full faith and credit were
sought. In view of the a:ffirmance of Atherton v. Atherton the reasonable conclusion is to the contrary.

Conclusions as to Case I
In view of the recognition recently given in the Supreme Court to
what has been termed the concept of "multiple domicils," and because
of the probability that the Court will be reluctant to build up an independent body of law on "domicil" for divorce jurisdiction, it is believed
that the S- r decree would be held competent to terminate the marriage
between Mr. and Mrs. Fish and that S-2 would be under a duty to give
full faith and credit to the divorce unless the :finding by S-r that Mrs.
Fish had acquired a domicil therein was unreasonable because she had
not complied with the minimum requirements for acquiring a home in
that state. Where Mr. Fish actually appears and contests, the chances
of the decree being held unreasonable would seem slight. 86 The court
84
85
86

Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 at 570, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
Id.
Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938), semble.
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in S-2 would still be at liberty to make its own determination as to
where Mrs. Fish had been domiciled at the time of the S-I decree, just
as the Massachusetts court was free in Andrews v. Andrews to make its
own determination of Mr. Andrews' domicil at the time he secured his
South Dakota divorce. In Andrews v. Andrews a determination by
the Massachusetts court as to his domicil at that time which differed
from the determination of the South Dakota court led to what was
held to be a not improper refusal to recognize the South Dakota decree
as a termination of the marriage. In Fish v. Fish the contention is that
a refusal to recognize the S-I decree might well be held improper in
spite of the fact that the S-2 court had determined Mrs. Fish's domicil
at the time of the S-I decree differently from the S-I court. Before
recognition could properly be refused, the determination of the S-I
court as to her domicil would have to be proved unreasonable on the
ground that in the light of what happened after the decree, as well as
before, she could not reasonably be found to have been present in S-I
before the decree with the intent requisite for the acquisition of a
domicil,-that of making her home there presently.
CASE

II

AcoursITION OF NEw DoMICIL BY WIFE FOR PuRPOSES OF
DIVORCE, No PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEING HAD
OvER HER HusBAND

Up to this point the positions that the writer has sought to maintain would not necessarily lead to abandoning the view seemingly
sanctioned by the Supreme Court, that the domiciliary state of one
spouse alone does not have jurisdiction to grant a divorce that is entitled to full faith and credit. It might still be that an ex parte divorce
granted to a wife in a state where her husband had not been domiciled
would not be entitled to full faith and credit. Even here, it is not a
baseless conjecture to predict that the Supreme Court, if it should adopt
the concept of "multiple domicils" in a situation like that considered in
Case I and should reach the solution indicated in the discussion of that
case, would modify its views as to the second type of case now to be
considered.
In this second type of case the facts are as in Case I, with one exception: Mr. Fish was not subject to the jurisdiction in personam of
the S-r court. He is domiciled in S-2.
It has been thought that under Haddock v. Haddock the decree
of S-I would not be entitled to full faith and credit. The majority
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opinion warrants the belief that the Court on the authority of that case
alone would require S-r to secure personal jurisdiction over him before
the divorce would be entitled to receive full faith and credit. Such
personal jurisdiction in r 906 could have been obtained only by his
voluntary personal appearance in the divorce suit or by his receipt of
service of process within the territory of S-r.
In 1906 the only method by which a state could secure judicial
jurisdiction in personam over a non-resident without his consent was
by service of process within the territory of the state. 81 This is no longer
so. A state may acquire jurisdiction in personam over a non-resident
motorist by methods other than that of personal service of process upon
him within the state; such jurisdiction is limited to suits upon causes
of action arising out of damage done by the motorist in the state. 88
A state may acquire personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who conducts business in the state through the agency of another by service of
process upon the agent; such jurisdiction is limited to suits upon causes
of action growing out of business done in the state. 89 There is talk of
"implied" consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the use of roads
within the state or by the non-resident's authorization of the transaction of business within the state. But the real reason why these
statutes are upheld under the due process clause is that the sufficiency of
contacts the state has in each case with the transaction giving rise to a
claim against the non-resident makes it ~ot inexpedient for the state
to exercise judicial jurisdiction.
Similarly, if a complainant spouse has so tied himself or herself
with a state as to make it not unreasonable for that state to claim him
or her as a domiciliary, the state should reasonably be held to acquire
personal jurisdiction over the respondent spouse by some method other
, than that of personal service of process within the state. True, in the
case of the non-resident motorist and in the case of the non-resident
business man, the non-resident may have willed that his car go into
the state where the accident happens or may have willed that the business be transacted in the state where it is carried on. It may be claimed
that the respondent spouse has not similarly "willed" any submission
to the jurisdiction of the divorcing state through consenting to the
acquisition of a domicil there by the complaining spouse. Jurisdiction
81 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877). One should note the stress placed on
that case in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
88
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927).
89
Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553 (1935).
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in personam, however, does not rest upon consent, but upon considerations of expediency. A century ago it may have been socially desirable
to base jurisdiction in personam upon personal service within the territory of the sovereign. It may not be expedient to be so limited today.
It is not necessary to debate the nature of divorce,-whether or not
it is a purely in rem proceeding. It does not necessarily follow that
jurisdiction over a respondent spouse who is beyond the boundaries of
the state is therefore unobtainable. Why should not that mode of
service suffice which is the most likely under the circumstances to make
the respondent spouse aware of the pendency of the suit?
Tum now to a case that will carry the discussion on along the lines
followed in consideration of Case I.
CASE

III

AcQUISITION OF NEw DoMICIL BY THE HusBAND FOR PURPOSES OF
DIVORCE, PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEING

HAo

OVER THE WIFE

Suppose that Mr. Fish has left his wife in S-2 because of her use
of alcoholic beverages, has gone to S-r, claims that he has acquired a
domicil there and sues for a divorce on the ground of "constructive
desertion." Under no statute of S-2 is the "contraction of gross habits
of intoxication" by a wife a ground for even judicial separation, but it
is a ground for a divorce absolute under the statute of S-r. Under S-r
law a wife who causes her husband to separate from her because of her
"contraction" of such habits is considered to have caused a "constructive desertion" which, with the passage of time, may ripen into a ground
for divorce.
If Mrs. Fish were subject to the jurisdiction in personam of the
S-r court by reason of her voluntary appearance or because she was
personally served with process within the state, and contested the suit,
little doubt can be had that a decree in the husband's favor would be
entitled to full faith and credit in S-2. In Davis v. Davis 90 the husband
had secured a decree of judicial separation from his wife in a court of
the District of Columbia. He later sued for a divorce in Virginia. The
wife appeared and unsuccessfully contested his allegation that he had
a domicil in that commonwealth. In a later proceeding by the husband
in the District of Columbia court for modification of the alimony order,
the United States Supreme Court held that the court of the District of
Columbia should give full faith and credit to the Virginia decree as
90

305 U.S. 3z, 59 S. Ct. 3 (1938).
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validly terminating the marriage. The decree had been granted by a
court in a state in which the husband had been held bona fide domiciled:
Seemingly it was not necessary to give any consideration as to the wife's
domicil. It had already been adjudged by a competent court (that of
the District of Columbia) that Mrs. Davis was the party at fault for
the separation. Whether or not she could acquire a domicil apart from
her husband it was not necessary for the Supreme Court to decide. She
had personally appeared in the Virginia suit. It was only necessary to
find out whether Virginia was the bona fide domicil of the husband.
The finding of the Virginia court was said to be not unreasonable. If the
Supreme Court had found the finding by the Virginia court unreasonable, then full faith and credit, so it seems, would not have been due the
Virginia decree in the court of the District of Columbia.91 The Court
did n,ot discuss circumstances which would have rendered the Virginia
finding unreasonable.
In Davis 'V. Davis the wife had directly raised the issue of the
husband's domicil in the Virginia suit. Suppose she had not done so,
but had litigated solely on the merits-unsuccessfully. Could she have
raised an issue as to the husband's domicil in Virginia when full faith
and credit were sought for the Virginia decree in the District of Columbia? Recent developments in the doctrine of res judicata lead to the
conclusion that she would be barred from contesting in the District
of Columbia issues that she might have raised-but did not-in Virginia.92 Assuming that the finding, express or implied, of the Virginia
court that the husband had a domicil within that commonwealth would
satisfy the test of reasonableness as indicated by the Supreme CourS
then any other state would be under a duty to give full faith and credit
to the Virginia decree.
Even if the wife had not contested at all, but had filed an appearance or had received service of process in Virginia, the decree might
still receive full faith and credit as a matter of constitutional right. It
would receive such faith and credit if the husband were domiciled in
Virginia at the time he secured the divorce.93 It seems that it would
receive such faith and credit if the finding of Virginia as to his domicil
within its borders met the requirement of "reasonableness." It is sug91 See Boskey and Braucher, "Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack," 40 CoL. L.
REV. 1006 at 1015-1016 (1940).
92 Cf. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371,
60 S. Ct. 317 (1940); and see Boskey and Braucher, "Jurisdiction and Collateral
Attack," 40 CoL. L. REv. rno6 at 1015 et seq. (1940).
93 This would be a logical deduction from Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562,
26 S. Ct. 525 (1906).
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gested that the question of "reasonableness" or "unreasonableness"
would turn on the same factors as were considered in the discussion of
Case I,-those dealing: with physical presence and intent to make a
home.
Davis v. Davis strongly indicates that jurisdiction to give a divorce
entitled to full faith and credit as a termination of the marriage relation rests with a state which has personal jurisdiction over the respondent wife by her voluntary appearance or by service of process upon her
and which has "reasonably" found that it is the domicil of the husband.
A sister state may "reasonably" find that the state of divorce was not
the state of the husband's domicil nor of the wife's. Nevertheless full
faith and credit will still be due the divorce decree. Only when the
determination as to the husband's domicil by the divorce court was
"unreasonable" will the obligation to give full faith and credit not
exist.
Now suppose that Mrs. Fish were not subject to the jurisdiction
of the S-1 court over her person by reason of service of process or voluntary appearance. The husband secures an ex parte decree. Its right
to full faith and credit would be dependent on the same considerations
as would govern in our next hypothetical case.
CASE

IV

AcQUISITION OF NEw DoMICIL BY HusBAND FOR PURPOSES OF
DIVORCE, No PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEING HAD OvER WIFE

Here it is to be assumed that Mr. Fish is married in S-2, that he
leaves his wife immediately after the wedding and eventually acquires
a domicil in S- I, where he obtains an ex parte divorce on the ground of
"utter desertion" continued over a period of three years "with total
neglect of duty." Later Mrs. Fish sues in S-2 for a decree of separate
support, alleging "abandonment" by Mr. Fish and "neglect or failure
to provide." The S-2 court finds that all possible steps were taken to
give Mrs. Fish actual knowledge of the pendency of the S-1 suit and
that no fraud was committed by Mr. Fish. However, it finds that he
left without "justifiable cause." Consequently, it holds that Mrs. Fish
always retained her domicil in S-2 and that since she was not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of the S-r court, the decree of that court is
not entitled to full faith and credit in S-2 as an effective termination of
the marriage. The case would fall within the holding of Haddock v.
Haddock.
The courts of S-r and S-2 might in this case profess to give the
same content to the concept of "justifiable cause." They might "legiti-
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mately" reach two different conclusions as to whether or not Mr. Fish
had had "justifiable cause" by. "distillation" of contradictory conclusions from the "same outward facts in the alembic of the same" concept of "justifiable cause."
Suppose the two courts did not profess to give the same content to
the concept. Is there any reason why each court is not at liberty to
decide whether or not the husband has had "justifiable" cause according to its own principles, standards and rules? Haddock v. Haddock
assumes that in certain cases the court of S-r has jurisdiction to grant
a- divorce to Mr. Fish even though Mrs. Fish has never been physically
present in the state-in cases where she has "wrongfully" refused to
follow him. How is "wrongfulness" to be determined? Upon the
"wrongfulness" of the refusal the jurisdiction of the S- I court depends. Whether or not this prerequisite to jurisdiction exists, the S-r
court can answer in its own way, save as the United States Supreme
Court otherwise prescribes. That Court has never said anything to
indicate that each state was not free to decide the question for itself.
Haddock v. Haddock approves Atherton v. Atherton. Had Mrs.
Atherton obtained personal service upon her husband in New York
and sued him there for a limited divorce before he sued in Kentucky, a
decree in her favor would have secured full faith and credit in Kentucky as a matter of constitutional right. Such conclusion is logically to
be drawn from the Supreme Court's approval of Cheever v. Wilson in
Atherton v. Atherton and its approval of both those cases in Haddock
v. Haddock. And yet New York would have decided whether Mrs.
Atherton had left her husband for "justifiable" cause by reference to
its own principles, standards and rules. True, in Atherton v. Atherton
as explained in Haddock v. Haddock much stress rests upon the fact
that Kentucky was the state of "matrimonial domicil," i.e., the state
where the spouses, being domiciled there, last lived together; but
nothing indicates that "fault" for a separation between man and wife
is necessarily and always to be settled by reference to the principles,
standards and rules of the "matrimonial domicil.'.' 94
Haddock v. Haddock assumes that only one solution could be given
to the problem of the wife's "fault." It was: she was "innocent." Only
one answer could be given to the issue as to the location of her domicil
at the time of the husband's suit. The answer was: it was not in Connecticut. The Court then rules that the domicil of the complainant husband alone do~s not have jurisdiction to decree a divorce entitled to
full faith and credit-the respondent wife must either appear volun9'

Cf. Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U. S. 108 (1869).
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tarily in the divorce suit or receive personal service of process within
the state. On the other hand, if the wife had been at "fault," her domicil (when the husband sued) might be found to have been in Connecticut. The decree of the Connecticut court could then have successfully
demanded full faith and credit, whether or not she had appeared in
the suit, ever received personal service of process in Connecticut or been
in that state.
Application of the concept of "multiple domicils" would modify
what seem to be the consequences of the Haddock case to this extent:
A divorce with only constructive service on the respondent wife is entitled to full faith and credit as a termination of the marriage relation
if the wife could reasonably be found to have been domiciled in the
state granting the divorce. The issue as to her domicil seems to turn on
"fault." The content to be given "fault" comes from the principles,
standards and rules applied by the state in which the husband sues for
a divorce. In other words, the court of that state must determine by its
own law whether or not a wife's failure to be with her husband, one of
its domiciliaries, is "wrongful," with the consequence that she is domiciled where he is. When could the court's determination on that point
be found "unreasonable"? Perhaps if the husband later in the sister
state contradicted the testimony he had given in the divorce court to
prove his assertion that his wife had "wrongfully" refused to live with
him, the determination by the divorce court as to the wife's domicil
would be held by the Supreme Court "unreasonable." If so, the case
of Haddock v. Haddock is not inconsistent with our contentions.
CONCLUSION

As far as one can see ahead, a suit for divorce will continue to be
something different from an ordinary action in personam. Theoretically
divorce might be a purely personal action. A state might pass a statute
under which its courts would entertain suits by any plaintiff who obtained personal service of process within the state upon the respondent.
Theoretically the decree might be entitled to the same faith and credit
as a judgment of a court of State X in an action for breach of contract
brought by a citizen of State Y against a citizen of State Z.
However, in practice, something more than personal service or
personal jurisdiction over the respondent, it is reasonable to assume,
will be needed to give a court jurisdiction to give a divorce that will
be entitled to full faith and credit. That "something" has been the
domicil of the complainant or of both parties in the state of the forum.
"Domicil," however, merely states a conclusion,-a conclusion drawn
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from life. "Domicil" has professed to be a certain conclusion. "But
certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man." 95
It is inevitable that to the concept of "domicil" different states will in
similar types of cases give somewhat different contents. Who is to say
that any are wrong? In certain cases the writer has tried to show that
the Supreme Court may take upon itself that task. Otherwise the Court
will forbear to condemn any concept of "domicil" as unreasonable in
content.
This reluctance of the Court is far from unsuitable under present
conditions. In former times a rigid dogmatism in applying the concept
of "domicil" may not have been inexpedient. With the present mobility
· of a large part of the population, it is not at all absurd for courts, even
when they profess to give the same content to the concept, to reach
diverse conclusions as to the domicil of a person at a particular time.
To hold that each of two states may reasonably be found to be the
domicil of both parties to a marriage for purposes of divorce jurisdiction is not tantamount to breaking down all barriers on divorce and to
making it a purely personal action. It will still be necessary for the state
of divorce to have some substantial contact with the marital status
( other than that of being merely the forum) to enable it to grant a
divorce that will be entitled to full faith and credit. 06 Nor is it objectionable to hold that each of two states may reasonably be found to be
the domicil of one spouse so as to have jurisdiction for divorce, provided the other spouse ( while not domiciled in the state of divorce)
is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the divorce court. Such holdings would be only reasonable modifications of what the Supreme Court
decided in such cases as Andrews v. Andrews and Haddock v. Haddock.
Such holdings would not be unexpected in the light of the recognition
given in Texas v. Florida to "multiple domicils." For the Court to go
further and to carry over into the divorce field the modifications it
has developed in other fields of the concept of "personal jurisdiction,"
as was suggested in the discussion of the second hypothetical case,
would mean in substance a reversal of Haddock v. Haddock. Such
reversal would not be undesirable. At long last the Supreme Court
would have found a way for avoiding the perplexities that arose with
its refusal to rule that jurisdiction to grant a divorce entitled to full
faith and credit might rest with a state that was the domicil of only the
complainant spouse.
95 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," IO HARv. L. REV. 457 at 465 (1879),
reprinted in HoLMEs, CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167 at 181 (1920).
96 Cf. Gould v. Gould, 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).

